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Abstract
In a co-evolutionary context, the survive probability of individual elements of a sys-
tem depends on their relation with their neighbors. The natural selection process
depends on the whole population, which is determined by local events between in-
dividuals. Particular characteristics assigned to each individual, as larger memory,
usually improve the individual fitness, but an agent possess also endogenous charac-
teristics that induce to re-evaluate her fitness landscape and choose the best-suited
kind of interaction, inducing a non absolute value of the outcomes of the interaction.
In this work, a novel model with agents combining memory and rational choice is
introduced, where individual choices in a complex fitness landscape induce changes
in the distribution of the number of agents as a function of the time. In particular,
the tail of this distribution is fat compared with distributions for agents interacting
only with memory.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of cooperation without an external enforcing agency, as an ex-
ternal coordinator, makes game theory based models attractive[1][2][3]. Usu-
ally, this assumption is done on the basis that the interaction between elements
can be absolutely defined, i.e., the fitness scale has an absolute value [3]. The
prisoner’s dilemma appears as a paradigm to model populations of interacting
agents that are able to form clusters of cooperative individuals. What happen
if the interaction between the elements is no more absolute? It is quite rea-
sonable to assume non absolute values of fitness scales in interactions between
agents. Different mechanisms can be responsible for this particular characteris-
tic. Either the agents can suffer or induce changes in their interactions (e.g., in
ecology by moving from one to other ecological niche) or they can simply avoid
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the interactions with other competitors. In both cases the induced changes are
not trivially fortuitous. For instance, some species of non-migratory birds, that
have an ecosystem at the river of a lake, are subjected to strong competition
against other birds of the same species due that some places are overcrowded.
During the reproductive phase this represent a high mortality rate. But it had
been observed that this species of birds make habitat selection, moving from
one habitat with high mortality rate to other place with higher fitness [4].
This change of fitness compensates the mortality of the species.
A frequent problem in game theory is the constant measurement unit assigned
to the outcomes of the game [5]. Even in bimatrix games, where two different
elements have the option to interact with different interaction matrices, the
measurement is absolute [6][5]. If we suppose the system is perfect isolated,
and the elements have available only a limited interaction palette, then the
elements have no other choice than to dispose of a single simple interaction
matrix. In contrast, if the elements are embedded in an open system, and
additionally have an internal reservoir that allows the search in the configu-
ration space, the interaction matrix cannot be absolutely defined. Therefore,
we introduce a very simple improvement in this kind of models by means of
the definition of flexible matrices together with individual bias (preferences)
for each agent. In this context, the novel approach presented here is the im-
plementation of relative values of the interaction matrix.
2 Model
In this model, the agents can remember actions in the past and they can take
decisions according to their stored information. Simple learning schemas can
be defined. For instance, one schema is ’copy the best’, where elements try to
copy the best interaction from their neighborhood and implement it in their
next interaction [7]. Memory is modeled as strips of information stored in the
memory of agent i that are projected onto vectors of strategies in order to
produce new actions represented by vectors σi [8].
The pair interaction is non commutative and is defined using an interaction
matrix F. The implemented game is a prisoner’s dilemma defined by a 2 ×
2 matrix, where the chain inequality T > R > P > S is obeyed (’T’ for
temptation, ’R’ for reward, ’P’ for punishment and ’S’ for sucker). In this
model only pair interactions are allowed. The interaction for an agent and
her adversary can be either cooperate -equivalent in statistical mechanics to
spin up- or defect -equivalent to spin down-. The vector notes each strategy
σ. If σi is the interaction of the agent i and σj is the interaction of agent j,
then, the total utility matrix for the agent i is given by U ji = σjFσi, and the
total utility of the agent i is defined as f i =
∑
j U
ij [5]. Under the imposed
constraints imposed by F, it is rational for the two agents to defect. But also
it would be of mutual advantage for the player to establish cooperation in a
long run. In the model the interactions are implemented in such a way that
the agents have perfect information from the past, but no information of the
instantaneous interaction of the adversary.
The definition of non absolute values in the interactions is made by means
of an extended interaction matrix Fp. Furthermore, an additional vector ζk
defines the preferred interaction of the agent i. This vector points into each
one of the interaction sub-matrixes to be fixed in each interaction. The utility
matrix for the agent i has in this case the following form
U ji = δilσ
j[ζ lFpζ
i]σi. (1)
The games are characterized by three kinds of sub-matrices. One sub-matrix
is defined under the restriction 2R > T +S. The second sub-matrix is defined
as a chicken game, which means, the mutual defection is the worst possible
outcome. Therefore, the values for this sub-matrix are T ′ > R′ > S ′ > P ′.
The values were arbitrary defined, but in such a away that T ′ < R′, i.e.,
’temptation’ is not dramatically different to ’reward’. Additionally, T ′ < T ,
i.e. is a low risk game. A third sub-matrix representing a constant interaction
is introduced, with the condition T ′′ = R′′ = S ′′ = P ′′ = 1. This last sub-
matrix implies for the agents a total risk aversion, but low incomes. Hence,
the agents interacting in the present model could basically choose between
more or less risk. Simultaneously, these three fundamental options allow the
game to switch between stable and unstable equilibrium states.
This model assumes a number of N agents situated in a lattice (see fig. 1).
Given that this is a square lattice, each element can only interact with its
four nearest neighbors, according to the Von Neumann Schema. The memory
size M of each agent is the main observable of the system. The acceptance
or rejection depends on the utility f i obtained by agent i. Naturally, the
evolution of the memory size of the individuals automatically implies changes
in the local strategies of the elements. At t = 0 there is a random distribution
of agents with low memories (M i < 2). If the total utility f i of the element i
is smaller than the utility of the adjunct opponents j, then a mutation of the
memory size of i, M i, occurs, i.e. M i → (M + 1)i. This mutation takes place
at frequencies ωm, that are proportional to the memory size. The reason is,
the assumption that the mutation probability in complex elements does not
take place with the same frequency as the mutation in much simpler elements.
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3 Results
Wemake a qualitative analysis of the distribution of memories when the agents
have no preferences, i.e., when the interactions are given by the canonical ma-
trix F = (3, 0, 5, 2). After a long simulation time a relative homogeneous
mixture of elements with low memory suffers a transition. The mixture be-
comes inhomogeneous and forms a structure that alternates between different
memory components. The colors in fig. 1 symbolize different memory size.
Blue corresponds to agents with low memories, whereas yellow symbolizes
agents with high memory. After long iteration time non-symmetric patterns
emerge. Although these patterns do not have a clear structure, they are also
not completely random. We compare this result with the behavior of agents
allowed to choose into the flexible fitness landscape (right side figure). At the
same time scale the distribution of agents with low memory dominates over
the agents with high memory, and only few non symmetric patterns with high
memory agents appears. The time dependence of the distribution of mem-
Fig. 1. Snapshot of the distribution of memories. The figure on the left side corre-
sponds to prisoner’s dilemma interactions. The right side figure represents mixed
interactions and agents with individual choices.
ory shows a rapid growth and subsequent extinction after some characteristic
time. The mechanism is in such case very simple: if the fitness of the agents
with memory M is large enough, then they do not find any resistance and can
replace other elements in the neighborhood and spread into the system. If a
new class of elements with a much better fitness and other memory size M ′
appears, these new elements start to spread. Eventually the agents with less
fitness, i.e. agents with memoryM , start an extinction process. The extinction
rate strongly depends on the interaction each agent chooses. When the agents
interact with flexible matrices < F >, which is equivalent to agents with
choices into the extended fitness landscape Fp, the fluctuation-dissipation is
no more in equilibrium. With less dissipation the agents increase their chance
to reproduce themselves. This fact is translated in the existence of self-similar
processes that take place in different time regimes. Therefore, the distribu-
tion in time of the number of agents with memory M , N [M ], have a fat tail
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when the interactions are more flexible than the simple interaction governed
by the prisoner’s dilemma. We can then concentrate us in a specific memory.
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Fig. 2. Distribution in time of the total population of the system < N [M ] > as
a function of the time for flexible interactions < F > (agents with choices into
the extended fitness landscape Fp) and prisoner’s dilemma F.. The inset shows the
non-normalized distribution of the number of agents with memory M = 6 and fit.
The distribution function is asymmetric and can be fitted with the following
distribution [9]
N [M ](τ) =
√
A0[M ]
2pi
e−A0[M ]/2τ
τ 5/2
, (2)
where A0[M ] is a fit parameter for each memory size. Given that the fit is
valid for a long time scale, the time parameter τ is defined as τ = t
T0
, where
T0 is the characteristic frequency where a growth and subsequent extinction
of the referred memory size takes place. In the present computations T0 ∼
T , where T is the period where the computations were done. This fit is a
reasonable approximation to the shape of the density function and is shown in
the inset of Fig. 2. In the same figure, the average of the population of different
memories < N [M ] > is shown. In long time regimes the suppression of the
dissipation in the case of flexible interactions allows a relative stability in the
total population (more diversity), whereas for the simple prisoner’s dilemma
a mass extinction takes place.
4 Sumary
The present work describes quantitatively the ability that an agent has to
choose in a complex energy landscape. This characteristic of the agents cannot
simply be ignored and must be implemented including individual memory
features.
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To sum up, the present results are a heuristic approximation to describe sys-
tems consisting of agents that can modify their fitness. Two main aspects can
be extracted from the present model: first, the possibility to obtain communi-
ties with high diversity and inhomogeneous spatial distribution. Second, this
diversity depends on the ability that each agent shows to choose the kind of
interaction she needs.
I want to thank H. Fort for very useful comments.
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